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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the outcomes of the negotiations on the multiannual financial 
frameworks (MFFs) of the European Union (EU). The key hypothesis is that the MFFs will be 
closer to the position of the member states than to the European Parliament´s (EP). Although 
the EP´s budgetary powers have been continuously strengthened, the MFFs strongly reflect 
the political agreements that are reached by the heads of state or government in the 
European Council. The European Council´s construction of package deals that combine the 
often conflicting views of the member states leaves the EP with little room to change the final 
outcome according to its preference. The argument is tested empirically through a 
comparative case study on the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 and the Multiannual 
Financial Framework 2014-2020. The results indicate that the MFFs are closer to the 
negotiation position of the member states. Despite the EP´s attempts to move the MFFs 
closer towards its position through rejecting the European Council´s political agreements, the 
outcomes of the interinstitutional agreements between the Council, the EP and the 
Commission broadly confirmed the compromises struck by the heads of state or government.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the impact of the member states and the European Parliament on the 
outcomes of the negotiations on the Multiannual financial frameworks of the EU. MFFs lay 
down the maximum annual amounts that the EU may spend in different political areas over a 
period of at least five years. Although budgetary decisions provide powerful insights into 
multiple questions (e.g. the power of the EU and its member states, the future integration of 
policy areas, the welfare distribution among groups or the solidarity within the EU), budgetary 
politics has been a largely understudied area.  
Contributing to fill this gap the paper examines the impact of the member states and the 
European Parliament on the MFFs. I argue that the outcomes of the MFFs are closer to the 
negotiation position of the member states than to the EP´s. Although Parliament´s legislative 
and budgetary powers have increased over time, the EU member states are hypothesized to 
be the dominant player in budgetary decisions. Yet, since the Treaty of Lisbon gives the EP a 
stronger role in the negotiations on the MFFs, it is expected that its influence has increased 
in the period post-Lisbon, but nevertheless remains below the member states´.  
Since budget negotiations come close to the ideal type of intergovernmental negotiations 
(Dür & Mateo, 2010, p. 558), particular attention will be paid to the European Council (EuC). 
Despite scholarly consensus on its key role for the conclusion of the MFFs, the EuC has only 
been subject to limited research. Furthermore, studies that examine the power of the EP and 
the member states are usually focused on the annual budgetary procedure (e.g. Benedetto, 
2013; Crombez & Høyland, 2015) or restricted to single MFFs (e.g. Dür & Mateo, 2010; 
Schild, 2008).  
The paper departs from this by analyzing the outcomes of the Financial Perspective 2007-
2013 and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 in a comparative cross-case 
study. In these cases the method of causal process tracing will be applied to reveal possible 
causal mechanisms linking the outcome to actors´ negotiation positions and to take possible 
changes in actors´ preferences during the negotiation process into account. Official EU 
documents and secondary literature are used as data sources to identify the positions of the 
EP and the member states. The empirical analysis shows that the final outcome was in both 
cases closer to the position favoured by the member states. In contrast, the expectation that 
the EP´s influence on the MFFs that are concluded post-Lisbon is stronger is not supported. 
Instead, the outcome of the MFF 2014-2020 was almost identical to the European Council´s 
political agreement. Thus, I draw the conclusion that the member states are the dominant 
actors in the negotiations on the MFFs. Although the EP has become a more self-conscious 
budgetary authority, it is still unable to fully utilize its formal rights. Decisions on the EU´s 
multiannual financial frameworks are taken to large extents at European Council summits. In 
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the conclusion I briefly point out to the implications of this finding for the role of the Council of 
Ministers.  
 
 
1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BUDGETARY POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU  
Whilst the Council of Ministers was given sole decision-making rights on the EU budget in 
the Treaty of Rome (1957), Parliament´s budgetary powers were increased in the 1970s. 
Following the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure introduced in 
the 1970 budget treaty, the power of the EP and the Council differed between the two 
classes of expenditure. While the Council maintained its dominant position on compulsory 
spending that arises from treaty obligations or acts adopted in accordance with it, Parliament 
was given the final say on non-compulsory spending. Non-compulsory spending was 
estimated to comprise around 3.5% (Rittberger, 2005, p. 136) till 5% of the total budget at 
that time (Ackrill & Kay, 2006, p. 119). According to Matthijs (2010, p. 6) Parliament´s 
enhanced powers “democratised the budgetary procedure”.1  
The institutional framework on budget politics was reformed again in July 1975. Next to the 
creation of the Court of Auditors that conducts detailed audits of the accounts of all EU 
bodies and thereby increases public accountability, the EP was granted the right to reject the 
budget as a whole. The so-called ´power of the purse´ strengthened the position of the EP by 
“allow[ing] it to promote its autonomous policy preferences” (Laffan & Lindner, 2010, p. 209). 
Yet, while the EP tried to use its newly acquired powers to influence the EU budget and to 
gain access to other Community policy areas, the Council wanted to limit parliamentary 
influence and preserve its strong position (Eiselt, Pollak, & Slominski, 2007, p. 80; Laffan, 
2000, p. 728; Neheider, 2007, p. 83f.). Because of the links between budget policy and other 
policy sectors and the cumbersome decision-making procedure annual budget politics was 
characterized by intense institutional turf battles between the EP and the Council from the 
mid-1970s onwards. In addition, disputes arouse on the Community´s own resources 
system, the contributions of individual member states to the EU budget and the size of 
individual categories of expenditure, esp. the size of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Thus, despite the reforms made in the budgetary treaties of the 1970s, multiple disputes 
hindered a smooth adoption of annual EU budgets in the 1980s. Overall, the Community 
“was plagued by budgetary crises” in the early 1980s (Nugent, 2010, p. 402).  
Thus, the European Council instructed the Commission to develop reform proposals on 
budgetary policy-making in 1987. The reform should establish a permanent solution to the 
                                                          
1
 An analysis of member states´ reasons to bestow the Parliament with budgetary powers is given by 
Rittberger (2005, pp. 114-142).  
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problem of the Community´s financing through balancing the objective of sufficient 
Community resources with the principle of budgetary discipline (European Council, 1987, p. 
7). In response, budgetary politics was substantially reformed by the EuC in 1988. Besides 
upholding the principle of budgetary discipline the heads of state or government decided to 
embed annual EU budgets into the so-called multiannual financial frameworks.2 MFFs 
consist of two elements: First, the total maximum annual amounts (“ceilings”) that the EU 
may spend in the main categories of expenditure (“headings”) for a period of initially five and 
now seven years is laid down in the financial perspective. Second, the objectives of the 
financial perspective are codified in an inter-institutional agreement (IIA) between the Council 
of Ministers, the EP and the Commission. The conclusion of the IIAs tied the hands of the 
three institutions in their negotiations on the annual EU budget and ensured their adherence 
to the previously agreed objectives (Giuriato, 2009, p. 74; Laffan & Lindner, 2010, p. 217). 
Since the MFF was constitutionalized only in the Treaty of Lisbon, the enforcement of MFFs 
prior to Lisbon depended on “the political willingness of actors to adhere to the jointly agreed 
institutional and distributive framework” (Lindner, 2006, p. 5).  
The MFF aims to “ensure that Union expenditure develops in an orderly manner and within 
the limits of its own resources” (Article 312(1) TFEU). Following Lisbon the Commission 
submits a proposal on the MFF to the Council and the EP. After having obtained the consent 
of an absolute majority of the members of the EP (MEPs) the Council might adopt the MFF 
by unanimity (Article 312(2) TFEU). While the EP was granted the power to reject or adopt 
the MFF after the Council had decided on it since the IIA in 1988, Lisbon increased the EP´s 
power of agenda-setting. As Benedetto (2013, p. 355f., original emphasis) states, “[t]he EP 
may be able to use this power of prior consent as a de facto power of proposal besides its 
veto.” Whereas the position of the EP was strengthened by Lisbon, national parliaments lost 
their previously veto power, since they do not need to ratify the MFFs anymore. Although the 
European Council is formally no negotiating party in the MFFs, it might increase its speed of 
decision-making by authorizing the Council to adopt the MFF by qualified majority voting 
instead of unanimity (Article 312(2)) TFEU). Two further aspects were altered by the Treaty 
of Lisbon. First, the provisional twelfths that apply when the Council and the EP cannot find 
an agreement will remain in place for an infinite period instead of one year. Second, the 
flexibility of the ceilings of expenditure was reduced through abolishing the distinction 
between a maximum and actual rate of increase for non-compulsory spending. Comparing 
the Lisbon provisions with the IIA of 1988 Benedetto (2013, p. 357, original emphasis) 
concludes that Lisbon is status quo oriented, since the “EP wins with a de facto power of 
proposal, [but] (…) loses on the maximum rate of increase”.  
                                                          
2
 For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the reform in 1988 on annual budget policy-making 
see Lindner (2006).  
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2. THEORIZING THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE 
MFFs  
Existing research on inter-institutional decision-making in EU budget politics is dominated by 
studies looking at the distribution of power between the Council of Ministers and the EP. 
Despite academic consensus on the key role of the European Council in the negotiations on 
the MFFs (Ackrill & Kay, 2006b, p. 127f.; Laffan, 2000, p. 742; Laffan & Lindner, 2010, p. 
214; Nugent, 2010, p. 406; Schild, 2008, p. 532), the body has been rarely the subject of 
research so far. As rightly criticized by Tallberg (2008, p. 686) research on the European 
Council is in general “dated, atheoretical and limited in empirical scope.”  
The budgetary reforms of the EU have been traditionally seen to have strengthened the EP´s 
powers. Parliament´s right to have the final word on non-compulsory expenditures in 1970, is 
usually regarded as a key moment for the institution´s development. According to Rittberger 
(2005, p. 114) the change was a “´stepping stone´ towards a parliamentary institution with 
´traditional competencies´”. Julie Smith (1999, p. 74) even states that the “The EP´s role in 
budgetary affairs is highly significant, since it has a much larger say than most national 
parliaments.” While this is disputed by some authors (e.g. Judge & Earnshaw, 2008, p. 198), 
most agree that the Parliament has acquired a stronger say on budgetary politics over time.  
Since the MFF is concluded with an IIA between the Council, the EP and the Commission, 
the negotiations have been regarded as an opportunity for the Parliament to pursue its 
preferences (Giuriato, 2009, p. 74; Laffan & Lindner, 2010, p. 209; Lindner, 2006, p. 5; 
Schild, 2008, p. 543). According to Lindner (2006, p. 5) the EU member states offer two 
types of concessions to the EP in exchange for its consent to the IIA. First, member states 
revise the financial perspective and/ or second, change the rules of the budget-making 
procedure. Since the EP and the Council are subject to different time horizons, member 
states tend to offer institutional instead of distributive changes to the EP (Lindner, 2006). 
Moreover, it has been argued that the EP has used its financial powers to realize its 
preferences on ordinary EU legislation (Laffan, 1997, p. 83). Studying the construction of 
package deals in the EU Kardasheva (2013) finds that the EP gains in other legislative areas 
in exchange for its consent to member states´ budgetary preferences.  
Although the negotiations over the IIA give the EP an opportunity to influence the MFFs and 
the EP has repeatedly announced its dissatisfaction with proposed as well as concluded 
financial perspectives, its “dominant strategy” has been agreement (Giuriato, 2009, p. 74). 
Giuriato (2009, p. 74f.) argues that the EP has refrained from blocking the enforcement of the 
IIA for fearing “the loss of reputation and of mutual reliance that non-compliance would entail 
in its interactions with the Council.” Moreover, she argues that the EP usually complies with 
the MFF proposed by the member states because of its “inability to radically change a 
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decision taken by Member States at unanimity” (Giuriato, 2009, p. 74). While she explains 
the limited impact of the EP by the voting rule in the Council of Ministers, Schild (2008, p. 
543) sees the main reason in the sequence of the moves. Examining the MFF 2007-2013 he 
finds only a marginal influence of the EP on the final outcome. According to him the MEPs 
were unable to make significant changes to the MFF 2007-2013 because of their inability to 
reopen the package deal agreed by the European Council. Moreover, the EP faced strong 
time pressures to finalize the negotiations on the MFF 2007-2013, since the first attempt to 
reach agreement by the EuC had failed.  
Like Schild (2008) Eiselt et al. (2007) find only a minor role of the EP in the negotiations on 
the IIA 1988-1992. According to them member states´ position determined the outcome, 
since the EU budget was stronger financed by national contributions than by the 
Community´s own resources at that time. Moreover, Eiselt et al. (2007, p. 87) point out that 
the European Council instead of the Council of Ministers is the dominant intergovernmental 
institution in the negotiations. The agreement reached by the EuC in practice overruled the 
institutional competencies of the EP and the Council. Thus, the institutions were restricted “to 
negotiating more or less predetermined budgetary figures” (Eiselt et al., 2007, p. 87). Nugent 
(2010, p. 406) even argues that “all final decisions ´on the Council side´” are made by 
unanimity in the European Council. The tight mandate by the EuC on the Council of Ministers 
has also been found by Laffan (1997, p. 89f.). According to her the Council is left with little 
room of freedom when negotiating with the EP after the European Council has reached an 
agreement because of the difficulties of finding another common position amongst the EU 
member states.3  
Besides being history-making events (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, p. 230f.; Peterson & 
Bomberg, 1999, p. 11) the main reason why the European Council is suggested to dominate 
the negotiations on the MFFs is its ability to construct package deals. Kardasheva (2013, p. 
859) distinguishes between two types of package deals. First, “omnibus” package deals 
connect multiple issues within a single legislative proposal. Second, several legislative acts 
can be linked in so-called “multiproposal” package deals. In the case of the MFFs, the 
European Council´s package deals offer each member state an acceptable net utility gain 
from the financial framework through combining expenditures in different policy domains and 
adjusting member states revenues (Neheider, 2007, p. 3). A prominent example for 
                                                          
3
 However, the Council of Ministers might also use the agreement of the European Council as a 
bargaining strategy vis-à-vis the EP. Tying its hands to the position of the EuC might be used as a 
strong signal of credible commitment to their position towards the other actors (cf. Fearon, 1997). 
Since member states´ positions in the negotiations on the MFF have been shown to be fixed after the 
European Council has reached a consensual decision, it is assumed that the position of the Council of 
Ministers that it represents during the negotiations with the EP is identical to the European Council´s 
agreement. 
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mechanisms adjusting member states´ revenues to the EU budget is the British rebate 
agreed at the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council (ibid.).  
In the literature it has been argued that the European Council offers a particular suitable 
environment for building such package deals (De Schoutheete & Wallace, 2002; James & 
Copeland, 2014, p. 528; Scharpf, 1999, p. 130). According to Fritz Scharpf (1999, p. 130) the 
political authority of its members allows the EuC to engage in negotiations that span across 
multiple policy sectors (see also James & Copeland, 2014, p. 528). Christiansen (2001, p. 
146) argues that the Council of Ministers´ horizontal fragmentation into policy sectors hinders 
its ability to build package deals. Furthermore, he points out that the European Council´s 
package deals might override the Council´s sectoral interests. Being complex and delicate 
compromises (Neheider, 2007) package deals cannot be easily altered in subsequent 
negotiations. Applied to the MFFs the political agreements struck by the European Council 
are unlikely to be significantly changed in subsequent negotiations on IIAs with the EP. Thus, 
it is expected that the final outcomes of the MFFs are closer to member states´ negotiating 
positions than to the preferences of the EP.  
Hypothesis 1: The outcomes of the negotiations on the multiannual financial 
frameworks of the EU will be closer to the position of the member states than to the 
position of the EP.  
Since the Treaty of Lisbon gives the EP a stronger say on the MFFs, I expect that the 
outcomes of the MFFs that are negotiated post-Lisbon are stronger influenced by it. The EP 
should use its newly acquired power to the fullest extent to move the outcome towards its 
ideal position. Besides the change in the formal rules studies showed that the EP has 
adjusted its working to the European Council (Hix & Lord, 1997). Schild (2008, p. 542) finds 
that the EP had intensively prepared its common position before the meeting of the EuC on 
the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 to get a stronger grip on the final outcome. Moreover, 
the increased use of informal institutions in budget policy-making, like for instance trialogues, 
have favoured the EP(Giuriato, 2009, p. 75). 
Hypothesis 2: Multiannual financial frameworks that are concluded after the Treaty of 
Lisbon are stronger influenced by the position of the EP than MFFs that have been 
concluded prior to Lisbon.  
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3. DATA AND METHOD 
Since the comparatively small number of five multiannual financial frameworks that have 
been adopted in the EU so far does not allow for rigorous quantitative testing, a qualitative 
case study approach is conducted here (Gerring, 2007). The hypotheses are tested through 
causal process tracing of the negotiation process of two MFFs. Since process tracing "tries to 
uncover the intervening causal mechanisms between conditions and outcomes through an 
intensive analysis of the evolution of a sequence of events within a case” (Levy, 2002, p. 
145), it allows to examine how the member states and the EP have reached a final outcome 
after a proposal has been submitted by the Commission. Agreements on MFFs are usually 
preceded by “protracted” and complex bargaining processes (Nugent, 2010, p. 406) making 
an in-depth study of the cases necessary. Furthermore, the focus of process tracing on the 
“temporal dimension of causality” (Blatter & Blume, 2008, p. 321) offers the opportunity to 
take changes in actors´ positions during the negotiation process into account.  
The negotiations on two MFFs have been selected for a cross-case comparison. While the 
first case study examines the bargaining process on the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 
that started in February 2004 and finished in May 2006, the second case study analyses the 
negotiations on the last Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 of the EU that was 
adopted in December 2013. Since the second case was adopted after the Treaty of Lisbon 
came into force and the first one before it, the selected cases allow for testing the second 
hypothesis on the change in the EP´s influence in the aftermath of Lisbon. Furthermore, the 
cases have been selected for being successive MFFs to hold some potential confounding 
factors, like for example the number of member states, constant.  
To identify actors´ positions secondary literature and official EU documents are used. The 
preferences of the member states are measured through an analysis of European Council 
conclusions. This is justified by the assumption that the EU member states are forming a 
common position after the heads of state or government have found a political agreement on 
the MFFs. Whilst member states might engage in serious discussions about the financial 
framework before a deal has been made by the European Council, the outcome of European 
Council summits gives them a negotiation mandate when bargaining with the EP and the 
Commission on the IIA. The position of the Commission is measured through its legislative 
proposal on the MFFs. Parliament´s preferences are identified through an analysis of its 
resolutions, its plenary debates as well as by the reports of the Committee on Budgets. 
Particular attention will be devoted to the reports of the parliamentary committee, since it 
plays a key role for forming a collective position on budgetary matters (Laffan, 1997, p. 74). 
The bargaining success of the member states and the EP is measured by comparing the 
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differences of their initial negotiation positions with the final outcomes of the MFFs that are 
codified in the IIAs (for a similar proceeding see Schild, 2008).  
 
 
4. ANALYSIS  
 
4.1 The Negotiations on the EU´s Financial Perspective 2007-2013 
The negotiations on the EU´s Financial Perspective 2007-2013 took place against the 
background of a period of low growth rates in most member states, the accession of ten new 
member states in 2004 and the agreement of the European Council on the Lisbon goals in 
2000 (Laffan & Lindner, 2010, p. 220). In February 2004, the Commission submitted its first 
proposal on the new MFF in its Communication titled “Building our Common Future - Policy 
challenges and Budgetary means of the Enlarged Union” (cf. COM (2004) 101 final). The 
paper identified three key policy priorities for the EU in the future: the development of 
sustainable growth; the completion of the area of freedom, security and justice to strengthen 
the evolution of European citizenship and the development of a strong role of the EU at the 
global level. To meet these objectives the Commission proposed an overall level of 
expenditures of EUR 1.025 billion that would represent an average spending level of 1.14% 
of the EU´s gross national income (GNI). Compared to the existing level of 1.09% of the EU 
budget 2006, the Commission envisaged more resources for the future EU budget. However, 
since its proposal remained below the own resources ceiling of 1.26% of the EU´s GNI and 
envisaged lower budget growth rates than in previous MFFs, the Commission took a “rather 
cautious approach” (Schild, 2008, p. 538).  
The EP broadly supported the Commission´s drafted MFF in April 2004. Yet, because of the 
forthcoming EP elections in June 2004, it decided to not take any concrete decisions that 
might restrict its scope for decision-making in future negotiations at that time (European 
Parliament, 2004, point 6). Furthermore, it criticized that the Commission´s proposal was 
undermined by “threats of budgetary cuts” that had been issued in a joint letter to the 
Commission by six heads of state or government (European Parliament, 2004, point 19).4 
Regarding the issue of agricultural spending the Committee of Budgets warned to treat the 
                                                          
4
 In this letter Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK called for a 
“consolidation” of the EU budget and suggested that the average expenditure level should not exceed 
1.0% of the EU´s GNI (European Commission, 2003). Moreover, the heads of state or government 
argued that the agricultural spending ceiling that was set by the European Council in 2002 should be 
respected. In his response, Commission President Prodi said that the suggestions would be taken 
“seriously” into account, but that a 1% ceiling would be insufficient to meet the Union´s objectives 
(European Commission, 2003).  
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CAP as fixed at the ceiling that had been agreed upon by the European Council in October 
2002 (ibid., point 14).5  
After first discussions in the Council of Ministers, the Commission submitted more detailed 
policy proposals in July 2004 (cf. COM (2004) 487 final). Following preparatory meetings on 
individual headings by an ad hoc group in September and October 2004, the negotiations in 
the Council were intensified under the Luxembourg Presidency in the first half of 2005. 
Several issues emerged as contentious during the negotiations: First, the member states 
disagreed on the overall amount of spending with six governments arguing for a reduction to 
1% of the EU´s GNI and others, primarily the net beneficiaries Spain and Portugal, 
supporting the proposal of the Commission of 1.14%. Second, conflict arose on the amount 
of expenditures that the new member states should receive. In particular, old member states 
that had benefitted from regional structural funds in the past feared the loss of transfers and 
demanded adequate compensation. Third, member states disagreed on the re-negotiation of 
the British rebate and the CAP.  
Despite the Presidency compromise of June 2005 that foresaw a total level of commitments 
of EUR 872 billion representing 1.05% of the EU´s GNI (Dür & Mateo, 2010), the European 
Council did not reach political agreement in June 2005. Furthermore, the heads of state or 
government stressed “the need for clarity over the resources available to the Union in 
support of common policies over the future financing period” (Council of the European Union, 
2005a, p. 1). In contrast to the member states the European Parliament (2005) adopted its 
common position in June 2005 (see Table 1). In comparison to the Commission´s proposal 
the EP demanded a lower overall level of spending EUR 974.837 million that would be 
around 1.18% of the EU´s GNI. Moreover, it argued for a shift in the expenditures from the 
category of sustainable growth towards the third heading of Citizenship, freedom, security 
and justice. Yet, overall, the position of the EP was quite close to the European 
Commission´s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 At this meeting the European Council agreed on the spending for market related and direct payments 
in the CAP from 2007 until 2013. It was decided that the overall expenditure for each year should not 
be higher than in 2006 with a yearly increase of 1% (Council of the European Union, 2002, p. 5).  
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Table 1: Overview of the Proposals of the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 
 European 
Commission 
(Feb 2004) 
European 
Parliament 
(June 2005) 
European 
Council 
(Dec 2005) 
Interinstitutional 
Agreement 
(June 2006) 
1. Sustainable growth  
1a. Competitiveness of 
growth and employment 
1b. Cohesion for growth and 
employment 
477.665 
132.755 
 
344.91 
 
459.035 
120.563 
 
338.472 
379.739 
72.120 
 
307.619 
382.139 
74.098 
 
308.041 
2. Preservation and management 
of natural resources 
Of which Agriculture 
404.655 
 
301.074 
396.248 
 
293.105 
371.244 
 
293.105 
371.344 
 
293.105 
3. Citizenship, freedom, security 
and justice 
3a. Freedom, Security and 
Justice  
3b. Citizenship 
18.505 19.437 10.270 
 
6.630 
 
3.640 
10.770 
 
6.630 
 
4.140 
4. The EU as a global partner 95.59 70.697 50.010 49.463 
5. Administration 57.670
6
 28.620 50.300 49.800 
6. Compensation (Bulgaria, 
Romania) 
0.240 0.800 0.800 0.800 
Total commitment appropriations  
as a percentage of GNI 
1025.035 
1.26 
974.837 
1.18 
862.363 
1.045 
864.316 
1.048 
Source: Own calculation.  
Notes: Numbers are calculated in EUR million at 2004 prices. The figure for the European 
Commission is based on its Communication paper (cf. COM (2004) 101 final 2). The figures for the EP 
are drawn from the Annex of its Resolution (European Parliament, 2005). Figures for the European 
Council are based on its conclusion (Council of the European Union, 2005d). The figures for the 
interinstitutional agreement are laid down in the interinstitutional agreement between the Council, the 
EP and the Commission of June 2006 (European Union, 2006).  
 
Discussions amongst the member states continued in the second half of 2005. On 5 
December 2005, the British Presidency tabled a compromise that foresaw expenditures of 
EUR 846.754 million (1.03% of the EU´s GNI) (Council of the European Union, 2005c). Yet, 
since the compromise strongly reflected the British position (Dür & Mateo, 2010, p. 560), a 
second compromise with a slightly higher level of expenditures (EUR 849.303 million) was 
issued a few days later (Council of the European Union, 2005e).  
In December 2005, the European Council reached political agreement. Table 1 shows that 
the outcome set the overall level of commitments at EUR 862.363 million, amounting to 
1.045% of the EU´s GNI. Compared to the Commission´s draft the member states suggested 
a reduction of around EUR 163 million. Thus, the outcome was “beyond any doubt (…) a 
political victory for the net contributing states” (Schild, 2008, p. 541). In absolute terms the 
                                                          
6
 Although the Commission demanded EUR 28.26 million for the administration in its Communication 
of 2004, the figure referred to policy fields. Thus, the number displayed here refers to the total amount 
of administrative costs (cf. Schild, 2008, p. 544).  
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European Council envisaged the biggest cuts in the first heading of sustainable growth and 
in particular for subheading 1a of competiveness of growth and employment. Upon the five 
objectives of subheading 1a (i.e. research and technological development; European 
networks; education and training; promoting competiveness in a fully integrated single 
market; social policy agenda) the largest increase was provided for the area of research and 
technological development (Schild, 2008, p. 541). The European Council´s total level of 
expenditures was with a reduction of ca. EUR 112 million closer to the EP´s than to the 
Commission´s (reduced by ca. EUR 163 million). In comparison to the EP´s negotiation 
position member states suggested lower levels of expenditures for each heading (except 
administration). Consensus between the EP and the European Council existed on two 
subheadings, i.e. compensation and agricultural spending. The latter finding is surprising 
given the EP´s initial stance that the CAP ceiling should not been seen as pre-determined, 
but should be re-negotiated.  
In January 2006, the EP rejected the political agreement of the European Council. In its 
resolution the EP criticized the strong focus on traditional distributive issues, the lacking 
reform of the Union´s own resources system and the reduction of expenditures for the Lisbon 
areas of competitiveness, growth and employment (European Parliament, 2006c, point 2). 
Furthermore, it demanded stronger budgetary flexibility and better measures to implement 
and control the distribution of EU funds in the member states. The role of the European 
Council in the negotiations on the MFF was strongly criticized by the EP that  
“[r]ecalls that the conclusions of the European Council – referring sometimes to very 
specific rules within spending programmes – cannot overrule the powers vested in the 
European Parliament as one arm of the legislative and budgetary authority and insists 
to play its full parliamentary role in the definition of policies, their reform and their 
budget.” (European Parliament, 2006c, point 3) 
Although the rejection of the European Council´s agreement was supported by a broad 
majority of MEPs (only 76 MEPs voted against the rejection), it was regretted by some 
Parliamentarians. Swedish MEP Cecilia Malström from the party group ALDE said that the 
EP should assume its responsibility instead of rejecting the financial perspective “because of 
power games between the institutions” (European Parliament, 2006b). Portuguese MEPs 
Francisco Assis, Luis Manuel Capoulas Santos and Edite Estrela from the party group of 
European Socialists expressed their skepticism towards the impact of that step, since “to re-
open the financial debate, which as things stand is not feasible (…).” (European Parliament, 
2006b) 
After Parliament´s rejection the EuC demanded a swift conclusion of the negotiations on the 
IIA “to implement the agreement of the December 2005 European Council” (Council of the 
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European Union, 2006, p. 2). Interestingly, the heads of state or government´s called for the 
implementation of its decision rather than for further discussions. This can be interpreted as 
a signal of credible commitment towards their previously agreed position directed to the EP. 
After several trialogues meetings which were dominated by conflict on the overall amount of 
the budget (EurActiv, 2006), provisional agreement on the IIA was found in April 2006 
(Council of the European Union, 2005b, p. 1). The IIA was formally adopted on 17 May 2006.  
Table 2 shows the differences between the proposal of the EP and the European Council´s 
political agreement with the final MFF. Overall, the final outcome of the negotiations is closer 
to the European Council´s position than to the EP´s, supporting hypothesis 1. The final total 
level of expenditures of EUR 864 billion deviates with around EUR 2 billion only slightly from 
the European Council´s compromise. In contrast, the final outcome remains around EUR 110 
billion below the level of expenditures that was originally demanded by the EP. Although the 
EP reduced its demand during the negotiations on the IIA to EUR 12 billion (EurActiv, 2006), 
the agreement remains far behind the demanded sum. In percentage, the total level of 
commitment appropriations of the financial framework deviated only by 0.23% from the 
position of the European Council, but 11.34% from the EP´s. Considering the expenditures 
for the individual categories the highest increase in absolute terms between the EuC and the 
IIA occurred for the heading of sustainable growth with EUR 2.4 billion. Whereas the 
absolute level of funding was increased after the European Council´s agreement for the 
majority of the headings, the expenditures for administration and external relation were 
reduced. Comparing the differences in percentage across the categories the final outcome 
diverged the strongest for the heading on citizenship, freedom, security and justice. In that 
heading, the EP´s demanded expenditures of EUR 20.000 million were reduced by almost 
45% to EUR 11.000 million. Yet, the heading is at the same time the category in which the 
distance between the European Council and the IIA is the greatest with around 5%. Since 
the IIA did not deviate from the European Council for the subheading of freedom, security 
and justice, the difference is solely caused by the increased expenditures for the category of 
citizenship that is a traditional core concern of the EP.  
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Table 2: Comparison of the Proposals of the European Parliament and the European 
Council´s Political Agreement with the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013  
 Difference IIA - 
EP proposal 
 
(in € million) 
Difference IIA - 
European 
Council 
(in € million) 
Difference 
IIA – EP 
proposal 
(in %) 
Difference IIA 
– European 
Council 
(in %) 
1. Sustainable growth  
1a. Competitiveness of 
growth and employment 
1b. Cohesion for growth 
and employment 
- 76.896 
- 46.465 
 
- 30.062 
+ 2.4 
+ 1.978 
 
+ 0.422 
-16.75 
- 38.55 
 
- 8.99 
100.63 
102.74 
 
100.14 
2. Preservation and 
management of natural 
resources 
Of which Agriculture 
- 24.904 
 
 
0 
+ 0.1 
 
 
0 
- 6.28 
 
 
0 
100.03 
 
 
0 
3. Citizenship, freedom, security 
and justice 
3a. Freedom, Security and 
Justice  
3b. Citizenship 
- 8.667 
 
+ 0.5 
 
0 
 
+ 0.5 
- 44.59 
 
 
104.87 
 
0 
 
121.15 
4. The EU as a global partner - 21.234 - 0.547 - 30.04 - 1.094 
5. Administration 21.18 - 0.5 174.00 - 1 
6. Compensation (Bulgaria, 
Romania) 
0 0 0 0 
Total commitment appropriations  
as a percentage of GNI 
- 110.521 
- 0.132 
+ 1.953 
+ 0.003 
- 11.34 100.23 
Source: Own calculation based on Table 1. 
 
Overall, the analysis shows that the outcome of the MFF 2007-2012 was closer to the 
position of the member states than to the EP´s. Although the EP´s rejection of the European 
Council´s political agreement send a strong signal to the member states, its demand to 
substantially renegotiate the MFF did not pay off in the end. The negotiations between the 
Council and the EP on the IIA led only to slight changes in the overall level of expenditure 
and the funding for individual headings. As stated by Spanish MEP Salvador Garriga Polledo 
from the European People´s Party during the plenary debate on the IIA in May 2006, “the 
final round of interinstitutional meetings has led to a final result practically identically to that 
indicated by the European Council” (European Parliament, 2006a).  
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4.2 The Negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Perspective 2014-2020  
Against the background of the economic crisis the Commission submitted in June 2011 its 
proposal for a Council regulation laying down the MFF for the years 2014-2020 (cf. COM 
(2011) 398 final). The regulation foresaw a total level of commitment appropriations of EUR 
1.025 billion that would amount to 1.05% of the Union´s GNI. In July 2012 the Commission 
submitted an amended proposal (cf. COM (2012) 388 final) because of the accession of 
Croatia, new data for regional GDP and national GNI that led to estimated changes in the 
allocation of the Union´s cohesion funds and more recent macroeconomic forecasts. In its 
proposal of July 2012 the Commission set up a higher total level of expenditures of EUR 
1.033.235 million representing 1.08% of the EU´s GNI (see Table 3). In general terms, the 
Commission´s proposal represented a “continuation” of the past MFF because of the 
Commission´s need to balance the austerity demands of some member states and to avoid 
the risk of deadlock (Kölling, 2012, p. 31). Yet, at the same time, the Commission included 
some reform proposals on budgetary policy-making that were traditional demands of the EP, 
such as budgetary flexibility (ibid.).  
Like in the case of the MFF 2007-2013 the EP formulated a common position on the MFF 
2014-2020. Yet, instead of waiting for the Commission´s proposal, the EP had established a 
special committee on the matter already before. The so-called SURE committee was 
responsible for determining Parliament´s budgetary priorities, estimating the financial 
resources necessary for the Union and for making proposals on the structure and duration of 
the forthcoming MFF (European Parliament, 2010). In June 2011, the European Parliament 
(2011) adopted its first of altogether four resolutions on the MFF. Several key challenges that 
the EU faced in the future were identified, e.g. the building of a knowledge-based society or 
the fight against unemployment. According to the EP the forthcoming MFF should primarily 
aim at fulfilling the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy (European Parliament, 2011, point 
130). Furthermore, the EP argued for more budgetary flexibility. It proposed to carry over the 
margins that are created by differences between payment ceilings and executed payments 
into a “global MFF margin” that could be activated in annual budget-making and to create a 
“reserve margin” for risks of defaults (ibid., points 137 and 138). Other demands of the EP 
included a legally obligatory mid-term review of the MFF (ibid., point 143) and a substantial 
reform of the Union´s own resources system that should replace national contributions´ to the 
budget with one or several genuine own EU sources (ibid., point 166). Although a list on the 
distribution of expenditures across different headings was not attached to the resolution – in 
contrast to the case of the Financial Perspective 2007-2013, the EP made clear that 
expenditures for the areas of education, research and innovation, for the development of the 
Union´s digital agenda and its space policy and for the support of SMEs should be increased. 
Regarding the overall level of expenditure the EP stated that the existing level of 1% of the 
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EU´s GNI is insufficient to meet the current and future objectives of the Union. Being of the 
“firm opinion that freezing the next MFF at the 2013 level, as demanded by some Member 
States, is not a viable option”, the EP argued that the resources for the next MFF should be 
increased by at least 5% that would amount to 1.11% of the EU´s GNI (ibid., point 163). 
Comparing this demand to the previous MFF it becomes clear that Parliament´s initial 
position is in general closer to the Commission´s than to the member states´ political 
agreement (see Tables 1 and 3). Second, the EP demanded a higher total level of 
expenditures than the Commission had initially proposed.  
In preparation of the European Council´s summit the EP adopted a second resolution at the 
beginning of June 2012, but emphasized that its negotiation position was identical to its first 
resolution (European Parliament, 2012a, point 2). Parliament repeated its demands of more 
budgetary flexibility (ibid., point 4) and made its consent conditional on a substantial overhaul 
of the Union´s own resources system (ibid., point 3). In addition, the resolution referred to the 
proceedings of the negotiations. First, the negotiations should focus on finding first 
agreement on the goals and priorities of the MFF instead of on total figures. Second, the EP 
pointed out that the political agreement of the European Council should not be treated as a 
fixed outcome by the Council, but as a guideline that could be altered during subsequent 
discussions (ibid., point 5).  
Despite discussions on the MFF at its meetings in June 2012 the EuC was unable to reach 
political agreement and postponed the decision towards the end of 2012 (European Council, 
2012, p. 3f.). Moreover, the body stressed that measures strengthening “growth, 
employment, competiveness and convergence, in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy” should 
play a key role in the forthcoming MFF (European Council, 2012, p. 12). Despite member 
states consensus on the role of the EU budget for boosting growth and employment, they 
were divided on the overall size of the budget, the CAP reform and the cohesion policy. Two 
groups of member states emerged in the negotiations. These groups reflected the traditional 
divide between net contributors and net recipients as well as member states´ differences on 
the EU´s anti-crisis measures. On the one hand, the ´Friends of Cohesion Policy´ argued that 
the overall size of the budget and the funds of the cohesion policy should be maintained 
(Kölling, 2012, p. 29). The ´Friends of Better Spending´, on the other hand, insisted that the 
level of spending is sufficient or should be even reduced and that the focus should instead be 
on a better management of EU spending (ibid.). 
Following discussions in the Council of Ministers the European Parliament (2012b) adopted 
its third resolution on the MFF. This resolution confirmed broadly its previous stance. Besides 
repeating its demand of an overall level of expenditures above the level of the 2013 EU 
budget (ibid., point 19), the EP “warn[ed]” the Council to reduce the level of expenditures that 
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was proposed by the Commission. While the expenditures for cohesion policy and the CAP 
should be maintained at the same level, the EP stressed the importance of providing 
adequate funding for youth-specific instruments (ibid., point 29) and large-scale infrastructure 
projects (ibid., point 34). Moreover, the EP linked its consent to the MFF to agreement on the 
reform of the own resources system (ibid., point 73). According to the resolution the main 
reason for stalemate in the Council of Ministers was the divide between net contributors and 
net beneficiaries leading to a “accounting-based vision of ´fair return´ which, in the end 
makes any agreement on the MFF conditional on an agreement on a long list of exceptions 
and compensations.” (European Parliament, 2012b, point 70) Furthermore, the EP repeated 
that the European Council is only allowed to provide the Council with a negotiating mandate 
for being no legislator (ibid., points 78 and 79).  
In November 2012, the European Council met for an extraordinary meeting to reach 
agreement on the MFF. The discussion centered on a compromise proposal of European 
Council´s President Herman van Rompuy. The proposal foresaw a reduction of EUR 80 
million to the Commission´s original proposal, representing 1.01% of the EU´s GNI (Council 
of the European Union, 2013). Furthermore, van Rompuy suggested increases in agricultural 
and cohesion spending as well as an increase by 50% in the area of competiveness and 
growth compared to the last MFF (ibid.). Despite the Presidency´s compromise the European 
Council reached agreement only at its meeting in February 2013.  
Table 3 compares the European Council´s agreement with the Commission´s proposal of 
July 2011. Member states reduced the overall level of expenditures for the MFF 2014-2020 
by around EUR 74 million. With the exception of the compensations category funding in each 
heading was cut. The strongest changes were made under the heading 1 Smart and 
Inclusive Growth in which the expenditures were cut by EUR 44 million. Yet, expenditures for 
the subheading 1a of Competitiveness for Growth and Jobs were slightly increased by EUR 
10 million. Since the MFF 2014-2020 is the first budget that provides less money for the 
Union, the outcome was a victory for the net contributors. Moreover, the funds provided for 
several programmes outside the MFF shows a clear preference for the intergovernmental 
method. While the size the MFF represents in terms of EU´s GNI will decrease over the 
years - from 1.03% in 2013 to 0.98% in 2020 -, a contrasting trend is discernible for 
programmes outside the MFF (i.e. Emergency Aid Reserve, European Globalisation Fund, 
Solidarity Fund, Flexibility instrument and EDF) from initially 0.03% to 0.04% in 2020 
(European Council, 2013a, Annex 1).  
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Table 3: Overview of the Proposals of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020  
 European 
Commission 
(Jul 2012) 
European 
Council 
(Feb 
2013) 
Interinstitutional 
Agreement  
(Dec 2013) 
Difference 
European Council – 
COM Proposal 
(in € million) 
1. Smart and Inclusive 
Growth  
1a. Competiveness 
for growth and jobs 
1b. Economic, social 
and territorial 
cohesion 
 
494.763 
115.52 
 
379.243 
 
450.763 
125.614 
 
325.149 
 
450.763 
125.614 
 
325.149 
- 44 
+ 10.094 
 
- 54.053 
2. Sustainable Growth: 
Natural Resources 
of which: Market 
related expenditure 
and direct payments  
386.427 
 
283.051 
373.179 
 
277.851 
373.179 
 
277.851 
- 13.248 
 
- 5.2 
3. Security and citizenship 18.809 15.686 15.686 - 3.123 
4. Global Europe 70.000 58.704 58.704 - 11.296 
5. Administration  
of which: 
Administrative 
expenditure of the 
institutions 
63.165 
51.000 
61.629 
49.798 
 
61.629 
49.798 
- 1.536 
- 1.202 
6. Compensations 27 27 27 0 
Total commitment 
appropriations  
as a percentage of GNI 
1.033.235 
1.08 
959.988 
1.00 
959.988 
1.00 
- 73.247 
- 0.08 
Source: Own calculation.  
Notes: Figures are calculated in EUR million at 2011 prices. The figures for the European Commission 
are based on its revised proposal (cf. COM(2012) 388 final). The figures for the European Council are 
drawn from Annex 1 of its Conclusions (European Council, 2013a). The figures for the Interinstitutional 
Agreement are based on European Commission (2013, p. 7).  
 
In March 2013 the EP rejected the European Council´s agreement with a broad majority of 
506 MEPs (161 MEPs voted against and 21 MEPs abstained). In general terms, the EP 
argued that the political agreement of the heads of state or government “does not reflect the 
priorities and concerns expressed by Parliament (…) and disregards Parliament´s role and 
competences” (European Parliament, 2013a, point 1). Furthermore, it criticized the 
insufficient means that were provided for the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy 
(ibid., point 4) as well as the rollover of outstanding payments from previous annual budgets 
that “might lead the EU budget into a structural deficit” (ibid., point 6). The EP formulated 
several demands that would be treated as an “overall package” in the negotiations (ibid., 
point 8). Besides expenditure increases in several areas (e.g. innovation, research and 
development; infrastructure and youth) Parliament called for an agreement on the Union´s 
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own resources system, increased budgetary flexibility and an obligatory mid-term review of 
the MFF (ibid., point 8).  
Three months later the EP and the Council of Ministers reached agreement on the IIA and 
the draft Council regulation laying down the MFF. The agreement was unanimously 
approved by the European Council on 27 June 2013 (Council of the European Union, 2013) 
and endorsed by the EP in November 2013.  
Table 3 shows the IIA that was formally adopted in December 2013 and the political 
agreement of the European Council of 8 February 2013. Neither the overall level of 
expenditure nor the resources for individual headings of the MFF were changed in the IIA. 
Instead, it confirmed the ceilings that were set up by the European Council several months 
ago. Yet, while the MFF was not altered at first glance, member states included some key 
demands of the EP in the final outcome. First, it was agreed to carry over the unused 
margins under the payment ceiling of the previous year to the following years from 2015 
onwards. Although budgetary flexibility was thereby increased in line with Parliament´s 
demands specific time and size limits for the carry-over were established as well. Second, 
expenditures for some initiatives that were regarded as key priorities by the EP will be 
provided earlier than originally envisaged. At its June summit the European Council decided, 
for example, to speed up the implementation of the Youth Employment Initiative and provide 
the envisaged sum of EUR 6 billion already in the first two years of the MFF (European 
Council, 2013b). Moreover, the margins that are left unused below the commitment ceilings 
of the MFF in the years 2014-2017 will be paid into a global margin for commitments that is 
directed to foster growth and (youth) employment. Several initiatives in the areas of research 
and education (e.g. Erasmus, Horizon 2020) and programmes to foster the competiveness of 
SMEs were also frontloaded. Third, the IIA laid down the maximum amount for some large-
scale projects (i.e. ITER, Copernicus; EGNOS and Galileo) as has been demanded by the 
EP. However, the overall amount for these projects is rather low with around EUR 12 million.  
Despite these changes the negotiations on the IIA did not lead to agreement on the reform of 
the EU´s own resources system that was a key demand of the EP. Instead of concrete 
results the institutions agreed to establish a high level group on the matter. Furthermore, 
member states did not provide a higher overall level of expenditures. In its resolution of 3 
July 2013 the EP criticized that the agreed ceiling “significantly reduce[d] any room for 
manoeuvre for Parliament in the annual budgetary procedures” (European Parliament, 
2013b, point 6). Furthermore, Parliament had been deprived of its formal budgetary powers 
during the negotiation process according to the MEPs (ibid., point 15). Overall, the analysis 
of the negotiations on the MFF 2014-2020 strongly support hypothesis 1. The final 
agreement was not only closer to member states´ position, but also almost identical to the 
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European Council´s political agreement. In exchange for Parliament´s consent member 
states agreed to institutional changes on the budgetary procedure and on the implementation 
of individual programmes.  
Comparing the negotiations on the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 and the MFF 2014-2020 
with each other the analysis shows that the outcome was closer to the position of the 
member states in both cases as has been suggested in hypothesis 1. However, contrary to 
hypothesis 2, the outcome of the MFF 2014-2020 was not closer to the position of the EP 
than the outcome of the Financial Perspective 2007-2013. Although member states made 
some concessions to the EP for its consent to the MFF 2014-2020, the changes were 
primarily of a procedural form. Table 4 shows that the fixed ceiling of the MFF 2014-2020 is 
contrary to the negotiation outcomes of two other MFFs (the Financial Perspective 2007-
2013 and the Agenda 2000). In these two cases the overall amount of the MFF was slightly 
raised during the negotiations on the IIA. Yet, the slights changes after the agreement of the 
European Council in the IIAs provide evidence that the outcomes of all four MFFs are closer 
to member states´ position than to the preferences of the supranational bodies that are 
traditionally advocates of a higher total level of commitments. Although the EP has become a 
more proactive and self-conscious player in the negotiations on MFFs, in particular since its 
first rejection of the EuC´s agreement on the Financial Perspective 2007-2013, its actual 
impact on the MFFs of the EU is still quite limited.  
 
Table 4: Comparison of the Political Agreements of the European Council and the 
Interinstitutional Agreements  
 EuC IIA Difference  
IIA - EuC 
Delors II package (1993-1999) 529.885 529.885 0 
Agenda 2000 (2000-2006) 702.78 704.26 1.48 
Financial Perspective (2007-2013) 862.363 864.316 1.953 
Multiannual financial framework 2014-2020 959.988 959.988 0 
Sources: Own compilation based on Tables 1 and 3.  
Notes: EuC = European Council; IIA = Interinstitutional agreement. Figures for the Delors II package 
(1993-1999) are calculated in ECU million, while figures for the other MFFs are calculated in EUR 
million. The figures for the Delors II package are based on the European Council conclusions of 
December 1992 (Annex 1 to Part C) and on the Annex of the Interinstitutional Agreement adopted in 
December 1993. Data on the Agenda 2000 are drawn from the European Council conclusions in 
March 1999 and from the Interinstitutional agreement of 6 May 1999. The figures for the Financial 
Perspective and the Multiannual Financial Framework are based on Tables 1 and 3.   
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CONCLUSION  
This paper analyzes the impact of the member states and the EP on the MFFs of the EU. 
Although the MFFs are widely regarded as key moments for the European integration 
process, its inter-institutional bargaining process remains an understudied subject. Focusing 
on the interplays between the member states and the EP for reaching a final outcome in the 
cases of the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 and the MFF 2014-2020, the paper aimed at 
contributing to fill this research gap. The comparative cross-case study broadly confirmed the 
expectation that the outcomes are closer to the negotiation position of the member states 
than to the EP´s. It was shown that the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 was only slightly 
modified during the trialogue meetings between the EP, the Council and the Commission. 
The MFF 2014-2020 was almost identical to the European Council´s political agreement. 
Although the member states made concessions in exchange for Parliament´s consent, the 
changes were limited and mainly revised the procedure of budgetary decision-making.  
The expectation that the influence of the EP would be stronger after the Treaty of Lisbon was 
not supported. The EU member states were not willing to increase the overall level of EU 
expenditures in times of national budget cuts. Against the background of the economic crisis 
the EP was unable to utilize its newly acquired procedural right as a bargaining advantage. 
Although the comparative case study showed that the EP raises its voice louder since the 
establishment of the MFFs in the 1980s, its influence on the actual outcome is still quite 
limited. The EP is far away from being an equal partner to the member states in the 
negotiations on the MFFs. The results of the negotiations amongst the member states in the 
EuC are still determining the EU´s long-terms budgets.  
Furthermore, the paper provided first evidence for the strong position of the European 
Council in the EU´s institutional framework. Although the EP has repeatedly argued that the 
conclusions of the EuC are only a broad negotiating mandate for the Council of Ministers, the 
latter did not strongly deviate from the political agreement or sought its approval on potential 
changes. This supports the view that the interactions between the European Council and the 
Council follow a hierarchical top-down approach. Thus, I draw the conclusion that the 
European Council acts as the Council´s principal in the negotiations on the MFFs of the EU. 
Furthermore, it confirms recent findings on the EuC that point out to its strong role in diverse 
aspects and areas of EU policy-making (Bocquillon & Dobbels, 2013; Eggermont, 2012; 
Puetter, 2014).  
Since the paper aims to provide an answer on the influence of the member states and the EP 
on the MFFs in a general way, additional variables that might affect their bargaining success, 
e.g. the coherence of the member states or the composition of the EP, should be elaborated 
in more detail by future research. Furthermore, future studies might take the Commission 
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stronger into account. Whilst the Delors-I package is traditionally seen as a success story for 
the Commission, the institution has become rather a mediator in the past two MFFs. The 
empirical analysis of the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 showed that its agenda-setting 
power was tightly constrained by the preferences of some member states. The reduced 
agenda-setting power of the Commission is a tendency that has become in general stronger 
in recent years (Princen & Rhinard, 2006). Yet, since MFFs are adopted by the member 
states and the EP, I focused on their interplays in this paper. The findings clearly suggest 
that the MFFs of the EU are determined by large by the agreements of the European 
Council.   
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